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Political decisions, constellations, and behaviors exert a large
influence of the dynamics of the severe acute respiratory syn-
drome coronavirus 2 (Sars-CoV-2) pandemic. Politics influences
the choice of containment policies and the compliance with
these policies—and therefore ultimately the epidemiological sit-
uation in each country, state, district, or even neighborhood.
This introduction puts the articles collected in this special issue




Covid-19 has been the toughest stress test for political institutions, public policies, and public administra-
tions in post-war history, in real time. In many countries, political institutions failed; others crumbled but
withstood the pressure. Public administrations demonstrated that they lag 30 years behind the technologi-
cal frontier. Many governments shied away from evidence-based policies and instead preferred to listen to
experts they carefully selected.
Sars-CoV-2 provided ample evidence that whether a virus becomes evolutionarily successful does not
only depend on the characteristics of the virus, its transmissibility, and lethality, but rather the success
of a virus is first and foremost determined by the level of social interactions between potential hosts.
A pandemic is a social phenomenon and therefore offers an excellent avenue for research not only by
virologists but also by social scientists.
Political scientists became interested in studying the Sars-Cov-2 pandemic because governments have
assumed responsibility for organizing humanity‘s response to the challenges posed by the pandemic. The
dynamics of the pandemic have been heavily influenced by containment policies, though these policies
have differed substantially across continents, countries, and regions.
In principle, governments can choose between any combination of six containment strategies: two phar-
maceutical and four non-pharmaceutical strategies. The two pharmaceutical strategies include the devel-
opment of Covid-19 medication and the development of Covid-19 vaccines. The four non-pharmaceutical
strategies rely on social distancing and surveillance efforts with testing to identify active cases: The first
available non-pharmaceutical response and often the first line of defense requires near-perfect isolation of
the infected individuals (Hellewell et al. 2020). The second strategy aims at isolating the geographic regions
the virus has reached from regions to which the virus has not yet spread (Chinazzi et al. 2020). If neither
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of these two strategies proves successful, a more comprehensive and radical approach must be used. The
third strategy aims at isolating the people that have a high probability of dying from an infection: In the
case of Sars-Cov-2, these are the old and vulnerable (Marais and Sorrell 2020) while at the same time, the
virus is allowed to run through the less vulnerable parts of the population until herd immunity is reached
(Randolph and Barreiro 2020). The fourth strategy relies on policies that aim at drastically reducing social
interactions into what is popularly referred to as a “lockdown” approach (Plümper, Neumayer, and Pfaff
2021). Obviously, these strategies are not mutually exclusive but rather tend to reinforce each other.
The politics of these pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical measures offer a fertile ground for
research in social science. Whatever strategy governments prefer and implement, the social, economic, psy-
chological, and political costs for the population from non-pharmaceutical interventions are massive—and
so are the distributional effects of the pandemic containment policies (Clarke and Whiteley 2020; Plümper
and Neumayer 2020; Clemens and Heinemann 2020), and the compensation schemes set up to alleviate
the burden of the containment policies for the most affected (Glover et al. 2020; Hur 2020). This special
issue brings together social science research on the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic. As Greer et al. have suggested:
“[T]here will be no way to understand the different responses to COVID-19 and their effects without
understanding policy and politics” (Greer et al. 2020, p. 1413). The articles collected in this volume offer
insights into the political causes and consequences of containment policies. All authors build on existing
social science approaches to analyze Covid-19. Articles focus on two different but related issues: (i) the
influence of containment measures, political institutions, and political attitudes on the dynamics of the
pandemic and (ii) the usually unintended consequences of the political response to Covid-19.
As many have suggested, the pandemic operates like a magnifying glass for social and political strengths
and, perhaps more so, weaknesses. As the U.K.’s Guardian has put it: The virus “did not remake the global
landscape so much as reveal what was already there (…). It amplified it, sometimes distorting it, some-
times illuminating it in alarming detail” (Freedland, 2020). But not all is bad: The pandemic also provided
politicians with an opportunity to demonstrate leadership, assume responsibility, and act responsiveness.
CONTAINMENT POLICIES, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND
ATTITUDES AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE PANDEMIC
Few countries were prepared for a pandemic (Bouckaert et al. 2020; Capano 2020) that was expected to
come with certainty (Contini et al. 2020; Fan, Jamison, and Summers 2018). Therefore, since the early
onset, decision making in the pandemic has relied on the reported data on cases and deaths (Karlinsky,
and Kobak 2021, Vandoros 2020). However, as Castle, Doornik, and Hendry (2021) note, numbers have
been subject to substantial revisions and occasional errors. For these reasons, governments increasingly
relied on forecasts and modes to better project scenarios considering the volatility and uncertainty of
current trends that continue to vary widely across regions and countries. However, early on, it became
clear that the highly volatile long-term forecasts’ accuracy of Covid-19 cases and deaths were less reliable
than their forecast intervals suggested. Castle et al. emphasize an alternative approach. They show that the
usefulness of forecasts can be enhanced when care is taken to handle non-stationarity and that inferences
and comparisons should be limited to forecasts based on week-ahead methods. Furthermore, based on
analyses of data from six Latin American countries, they show that these week-ahead methods become
more reliable during periods when case numbers are declining, and similarly forecasting errs more often
during ramping up periods, or those in which data are subject to significant revision.
Notwithstanding the insights from these types of statistical models, most governments had to improvise
and return to containment policies that had, to no avail, been developed to contain the plague: lockdowns
and quarantines of the infected, people with whom they had been in contact, and travelers returning from
high incidence areas. As social scientists have repeatedly demonstrated, the timing of a response and the
choice of a combination of containment measures does not only depend on the epidemiological situation
and dynamics but also political institutions (Plümper, Neumayer, and Pfaff 2021; Toshkov, Carroll, and
Yesilkagit 2021), partisan preferences at least in the United States (Adolph et al. 2020; Pickup, Stecula, and
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Van Der Linden 2020), the characteristics of political leaders, and on political trust and political culture
(Adolph et al. 2021; Jennings et al. 2021).
The pandemic quickly revealed a large set of country-specific problems: The health system of many
countries was underequipped, understaffed, and underfinanced, political decision making proved to be
slow and inefficient, or, in countries with emergency legislation, fast, arbitrary, and volatile. In Germany,
one of the world’s technologically most advanced countries, information on new infections was trans-
ferred via fax machines to the Robert Koch Institute. Schools painfully demonstrated their inability and,
occasionally, their unwillingness to organize remote lessons via the internet (Barberia et al. 2020). In some
countries, the health system collapsed or was at the brink of collapse. Yet some politicians denied the
severity of the virus, the pandemic, or even the existence of the virus.
It is perhaps fair to say that most governments have responded initially with little knowledge of the
nature of the virus but with the best intentions. Under the impression of powerful footage from Northern
Italy, most European governments implemented more or less stringent lockdown policies—Sweden, Nor-
way, and Iceland being the exceptions (Plümper and Neumayer 2020a). The standard response combined
social distancing, shop, bar, and school closures. Curfews and the closure of firms producing non-essential
goods and services were rare but nevertheless occurred. Taken together, these policies triggered a cycle of
high and rising infection and mortality rates, followed by stringent containment policies, which reduced the
pandemic dynamics; in turn, governments reduced the stringency of measures, and the next cycle started.
Just looking at Europe, Sweden was perhaps the most important, and certainly the most widely observed
and discussed, exception. The Swedish government refused to implement a strict lockdown during the first
wave of the pandemic and kept shops, bars, and restaurants open (Hensvik and Skans 2020). Sweden was
not alone with this strategy, but it became the role model. Other countries, including Norway and Iceland,
avoided lockdown by implementing early and comprehensive travel restrictions.
From a global perspective, the choice of containment strategies showed more variation across countries
(An and Tang 2020). Apparently, stringent and strict travel restrictions work reasonably well for island
countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan. Testing with tracing apps and strictly enforced
quarantine policies helped South Korea, China, and Singapore to keep the pandemic largely under control.
However, in the United States, the pandemic and containment policies deepened the country’s pre-existing
polarization. States governed by the Democrats implemented relatively stringent containment, while states
governed by the Republicans relied on laxer containment policies.
In the first article of this collection, Barberia et al. (2021) stress the heterogeneity in containment poli-
cies in another large federal state: Brazil. The country is an excellent case for studying an uncoordinated
and often confused response to Covid-19. Like Lukashenko in Belarus, Putin in Russia, and Trump in
the United States, the Bolsonaro government downplayed the severity of the pandemic, took an explicit
“do nothing” stance on containment policies and even tried to prohibit local and regional governments
from implementing more stringent containment policies (Barberia and Gomez, 2020). In the end, Brazil-
ian “state governments took a lead role in implementing social distancing policies to prevent the spread of
Covid-19 within their territories, and these subnational governments have been consistently recognized as
dominant in cases where more lax federal legislation introduced by President Jair Bolsonaro has attempted
to circumvent the containment strategies.” Barberia et al. (2021) show that the pandemic’s dynamics (Cas-
tro et al. 2021) and the causal mechanism that shapes the dynamic have been heterogeneous across Brazil-
ian states.
These results cannot be generalized to other federal states (Buthe et al. 2020). Germany implemented
containment policies that did not vary much between high incidence states in the South and West and low
incidence states in the North and East. This strict policy was partly relaxed during the second wave when
Germany introduced a decentralized element to containment policies and eventually linked containment
policies to the incidence rate in districts. However, the central government dominated public debates and
policy making alike throughout the pandemic.
Ratto et al. (2021) expand the perspective to 15 Latin American countries (excluding Brazil from the
sample) and analyze the pandemic dynamics during the first wave of the pandemic. They distinguish
between three phases: During the first phase, most Latin American governments implemented stringent
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containment measures. During the second phase, these containment policies were slowly phased out. Dur-
ing the third phase, governments removed most containment policies. Ratto et al. provide evidence that
the pandemic situation follows the stringency of containment policies from the second phase on. As the
pandemic evolves, the correlation between the stringency of containment policies and the number of daily
new infections increasingly became negative. These results ought to be expected: Non-pharmaceutical
interventions only reduce incidence rates if a sufficiently large part of the population changes its behavior.
The question of the extent to which citizens accept social distancing norms motivates the article of
Stegmuller et al. 2021. They study the prevalence of non-compliance with public health guidelines through
the lens of a survey experiment in nine countries. The sample varies with respect to incidence and mor-
tality rates and, more importantly, governments’ choices of containment policies. Their sample includes
Sweden, the role model for liberal containment policies, New Zealand, the role model for ultra-strict travel
restrictions, and Italy, a country overwhelmed by the first wave that relied on rigid lockdown policies. Their
list experiment suggests that more participants report to have not adhered to containment policies than
we would find based on traditional surveys—a result that often occurs and is usually explained by the exis-
tence of social desirability bias in classical surveys. Their experiment also reveals a large variation in the
degree of non-compliance across countries—a variation that correlates with the stringency of lockdown-
style policies: "On average, countries with strict policy measures, such as France or Italy, show lower levels
of ignorance of health guidelines, compared to countries with more lenient measures, such as Australia, the
United States, or Sweden.” At the individual level, the authors are mainly interested in the determinants of
non-compliance.
Who ignores social distancing rules? The authors find a significant correlation between ideology and
non-compliance in some but not in all countries. In the United States, a country with a highly politicized
and polarized response to Covid-19 (Kubinec et al. 2020; Stecula and Pickup 2021), individuals that place
themselves on the extreme right of the political spectrum are less likely to practice social distancing. But in
the analyzed country sample, the United States is an outlier (Pickup, Stecula, and van der Linden 2021). In
European countries, no ideological difference in adherence to social distancing norms can be observed.
Lewis and Duch (2021) also conduct a survey experiment to explore the existence of a gender gap
in risk perception in the United States. The study provides evidence that risk perception and behavior
are associated—a result that is well-established in the psychological and economic literature. Galasso et al.
(2020) find similar gender differences in compliance with social distancing norms. More importantly, Lewis
and Duch demonstrate that men and women estimate their individual risk of becoming infected with Sars-
CoV-2 to be lower than the population average, and they show that the gender gap in risk perception
widens in an experimentally framed high-risk setting.
Travel restrictions run counter to the DNA of European integration and have been one of the least
used policies that governments had at their disposal—at least in Europe. At the very early stage of the
pandemic, when the international spread of the virus could have slowed down and perhaps even stopped,
many governments were reluctant to implement travel restrictions. When governments implemented travel
restrictions, the virus had already been brought to most countries by international travelers. E.U. members
were unprepared at the early stages of the pandemic and had no plan in place that allowed the tempo-
rary suspension of European law in emergency situations. For the second wave of the pandemic, Neu-
mayer, Plümper, and Shaikh (2021) provide evidence that travel restrictions—mostly test and quarantine
requirements—have been implemented by countries with relatively low incidence rates on travelers from
countries with higher incidence rates, and governments had to use relatively stringent containment mea-
sures. In other words, travel restrictions are an essential part of the anti-corona policy arsenal over which
governments command, and for some countries, the most important instrument. From the perspective
of models of opportunistic government (Downs 1957), it is undoubtedly most interesting that countries
depending on income from international tourism have tried to keep borders open until the tourist season
was over—and then had to use a rather stringent policy mix to again bring down the high incidences that
result from relatively unconstrained travel.
Kubinec, Lee, and Tomashevskiy (2021) also refer to an opportunistic logic of government to explain
why countries that suffer from political and administrative corruption often had high incidence rates. In
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a sample of three corrupt countries, Kubinec explain why some companies could keep their business
running, while others had to close during a lockdown. What drives these differences? While an epidemio-
logical explanation would stress the intensity of social interactions in each sector and firm, Kubinec et al.
highlight the “ties” between companies and government, their political connectedness (Fisman 2001).
They demonstrate that governments have utilized an arbitrary distinction between system-relevant sectors
and industries that are claimed to be non-essential—arbitrary as long as we ignore the linkages between
the companies that kept businesses open and the government also showed that the definition of “essen-
tial” varied from country to country. Analyzing Egypt, Venezuela, and Ukraine, they show that “politically
connected firms are significantly less likely to comply with Covid-19 shutdown restrictions.” Of course,
this study leaves open whether governments are unwilling or administrations unable (or both) to enforce
restrictions for well-connected firms. However, Kubinec et al.’s result highlights the relevance of corrup-
tion and cronyism for the effectiveness of containment policies. While much recent research has shown
that corruption is associated with a less stringent policy response, Kubinec et al.’s result is consistent even
with a comparatively stringent policy response by corrupt governments: The more stringent the contain-
ment policies, the larger the competitive advantages for firms that do not have to comply with measures
because they are “connected’ with their government and public administrations.
Social science research on the stringency of containment policies leaves no doubt that the effectiveness
of non-pharmaceutical health policies is not fully explained by the pandemic situation. Political incentive
structures also influence the political response—often in ways that political scientists have analyzed for
decades. If anything, the pandemic has revealed that old theories of political decision making work rea-
sonably well to explain response patterns of the public and governments during the pandemic. In other
words: Microfoundations typically used in social science theories have weathered the pandemic stress test
fairly well.
However, political and social scientists should keep potential caveats in mind: First, the influence of
partisan preferences measured on a traditional left–right scale, formal political institutions such as electoral
systems, political decentralization, veto-players have, outside countries that already had polarized partisan
conflicts before the pandemic (Kubinec et al. 2020), been less influential than “weak” factors, most notably
trust in government and public administration. Political trust influences compliance, thus indirectly the
political costs of containment policies for incumbents and opposition parties that support containment
policies. Apparently, containment policies work best when a vast population share voluntarily follows the
rules and regulations. If governments have to enforce containment policies, the higher the political costs
of these measures.
Second, the pandemic, while operating like a magnifying glass that revealed the weaknesses of each
country, each political system, each public administration, and perhaps even each politician in great detail,
has had less political consequences than political scientists arguably would have expected before the virus
hit the world. Many governments repeatedly implemented harsh lockdowns over an extended period, and,
yes, that triggered protests but few riots. It gave rise to the emergence of new and often dubious political
groups but did not lead to a substantive strengthening of populist parties.
THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONTAINMENT POLICIES
The pandemic, the containment policies, and the compensation schemes set up to moderate the contain-
ment policies had vast economic consequences and distributive effects. By the end of 2021, the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has predicted that global Gross Domestic
Production (GDP) will still fall short of pre-pandemic levels by approximately $3000 billion. This resem-
bles roughly the annual GDP of countries like the United Kingdom, India, or France. The economic
footprint the pandemic left on countries is huge, but so is the variation of this economic malaise across
countries: China returned to pre-pandemic income levels already during the second quarter of 2020. At the
other end of the distribution, Argentina is predicted to return to pre-pandemic income levels, not before
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the second quarter of 2026. The crisis lasted two quarters in China but is expected to linger for 25 quarters
in Argentina.
Economic redistribution within each country also was substantial. Covid-19 is more likely to harm the
old and vulnerable. While reducing the risk for the old and the sick, containment policies mount costs on
parents with young children, the working population, and especially those in exposed and essential sectors.
At the same time, compensation schemes have raised public debts and currently cause a return of inflation
as a global problem, thus redistributing wealth from creditors to debtors and from future tax-payers to
current tax-payers.
Containment policies (or their absence) have economic, social, and psychological consequences that
cannot remain without political consequences. In principle, one could expect that the incumbents and
other parties supporting containment policies would gain political support from groups profiting from
containment policies and lose political support from groups that have to pay the bill. However, this is not
what happens. During the first wave, most incumbent parties gained political support—a phenomenon
described as “rally around the flag” by political scientists. (Bol et al. 2021; Schraff 2020). In addition,
Esaiasson et al. (2021) find an increase in support for democratic institutions. Hence, the majority of
studies of incumbency effects during the pandemic are in line with research that suggests that crises and
disasters instigate increased support for the governing party (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011). However, in
countries with polarized politics, political leaders do not necessarily profit. Clarke, Stewart, and Ho (2021)
and Gomez and Barberia (2020) discuss why Trump in the United States and Bolsonaro in Brazil failed to
profit from the rally around the flag effect.
While most published studies have relied on traditional survey designs, Freden et al. 2021 utilize what
they call a question-based computer language assessment. Rather than letting survey participants assess the
incumbent’s performance and ask what party they would vote for if there were elections, Freden et al. asks
participants to describe the current Prime Minister in two keywords. The distribution of keywords is used
to evaluate whether the support for the incumbent is rising or falling. Using this technique, they find that
west European citizens became more positive about the incumbent during lockdowns. The authors also
show that leader evaluations are contingent on the partisan preferences of the voter. Apparently, supports
for incumbents increase during the pandemic, but more so with voters who probably would vote for the
incumbent party anyways. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the pandemic, in the long run, stabilizes
political competition or leads to the further polarization of political competition along partisan lines.
Pickup, Stecula, and van der Linden (2021) provide further evidence that the pandemic potentially
increases political polarization and may lead to the emergence of antagonistic political camps. Their study
uses the distinction between Leavers and Remainers in the post-Brexit United Kingdom. It shows that
Leavers have become more antagonistic against immigrants during the pandemic, while the Remainers
have not significantly changed their political attitudes toward immigrants. Of course, it may be too early
to tell whether the camps of Remainers and Leavers are sufficiently stable to create a divide. Pickup et al.
at least suggest that the Brexit position, while initially a function of “pre-existing attitudes, values, and
sociodemographic characteristics,” increasingly becomes a “Brexit identity.” If that is true, then political
scientists should be increasingly able to demonstrate that every policy preference of the voters is corre-
lated with the voters’ Brexit identity—and that also holds for the attitude toward immigration during the
pandemic as Pickup et al. demonstrate.
Political polarization and Covid-19 are an unhealthy combination in more than one respect. While the
pandemic had little influence on electoral outcomes (yet) in most countries, the potentially most important
exception was, argue, the United States. Admittedly, we cannot know the counterfactual. Would Trump
have won the election if the pandemic had not happened? Would Trump still reside in the White House
if he had not downplayed the severity of the virus and if his government had, with the majority of U.S.
state governments, implemented a more coherent and more stringent containment policy? Clarke et al.
argue that, indeed, Covid-19 and the lackluster response to the pandemic contributed largely and perhaps
decisively to the electoral defeat.
Clarke, Stewart, and Ho (2021) interpret containment policies as an excellent example of what political
scientists call “valence issues.” In principle, valence issues are politically uncontroversial because the
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majority of the electorate agrees at least on the political aims. Confronted with an emergent valence issue
such as Covid-19, an issue that is perhaps not well understood, the dominant strategy for all incumbents
should have been to stress the importance of the issue, suggest a reasonable set of policies, and be open to
public and political debates about these policies. This strategy has fueled the “rally around the flag” in most
democracies. Clarke et al. offer ample evidence that, unlike most other incumbents, the Trump adminis-
tration could not profit from the pandemic (Clarke et al. 2021; Clarke, Stewart, and Whiteley 2020). Survey
research suggests that voters did not agree with the “do nothing and blame the Chinese’s strategy” and
judged Trump’s anti-Covid credentials very low. Clarke et al. admit that an earlier breakthrough with vac-
cines could have increased political support for Trump, but either the vaccine came too late or the election
too early. From a valence issue perspective, it could well be that any other political response to Covid-19
other than denial of the problem would have increased the electoral chances of the Trump government.
2021.’s article study the effects of Covid-19 on voting from a related but different angle, arguing that
the pandemic increases the perceived risk of voting and thus the cost of voting. As a consequence, turnout
should decline. In fact, it should decline most in societal groups that profit the least from their electoral
choice. However, at the same time and to the extent partisan differences on the optimal containment
policy exist, voting may also increase the perceived utility from voting. When policies are more likely to
matter, and when parties disagree more fundamentally on optimal policies, the incentives to vote increase.
Which effect dominates during the Covid-19 pandemic? Cooperman et al. argue that the pandemic reduces
turnout in the Brazilian municipal elections in November 2020 in districts that have high incidence rates,
that had high incidence rates at earlier stages of the pandemic, and that are neighboring districts with high
incidence rates. They find support for their expectations: Voter turnout is lowest where the incidence and
mortality rates are relatively high. This also holds if only nearby districts have high incidence and mortality
rates.
Finally, Plümper, Neumayer, and Pfaff (2021) analyze the emergence of protest against containment
policies in Germany. According to their analyses, protest organizers terminate and locate protest events at
least partly strategically. Protest events take more frequently place when containment policies are stringent,
where mortality rates are relatively low, and where mainstream parties have been relatively week in the last
election.
CONCLUSION
Epidemiological dynamics, political institutions, containment policies, and the public response influence
each other, condition each other, and reinforce or weaken each other. The articles in this special issue
study a small selection of mechanisms that reveal the influence of politics on containment policies, and
the influence of containment policies on political attitudes, behaviors, and decisions. Like most published
research on Covid-19, the contributions here describe the force of the pandemic as a stress test for political
systems, institutions, decision-making processes, and public policies. Apparently, in many countries, the
pandemic demonstrated that not all is well and that holds first and foremost for the political response to
Covid-19.
Unlike any previous pandemic or epidemic, Covid-19 is, and needs to be analyzed and understood,
a political phenomenon. Researchers of natural disasters (Bakkensen et al. 2017; Plümper, Flores, and
Neumayer 2017) have developed the concept of resilience to describe whether natural hazards become
disasters for the affected population (World Bank 2010). When resilience is high, even large hazards remain
manageable for the society and the government, and the number of fatalities stays low. Sars-CoV-2 is
a natural hazard that became a disaster for most countries, mainly because preparedness was low. But
resilience is more than preparedness. Resilience is a concept that describes how well an entity, say a country,
copes with the unexpected. It is possible that governments and citizens alike are unprepared but resilient.
It may also be that governments and citizens are prepared but not resilient. One can clearly expect a
pandemic, as we should have, and still not cope well.
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These articles clearly lay bare the “endogenous” nature of a pandemic. However, while social scientists
have learned to interpret endogeneity as a nuisance and work their way around it, the pandemic and the
containment policies do so obviously influence each other, and no comprehensive understanding of pan-
demic politics is possible if we isolate the effect of containment policies on the pandemic from the effect
of the pandemic on containment policies. Containment policies are not only implemented to reduce the
incidence and mortality rates, they are also implemented to increase the probability that governments do
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